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DISABILITIES AND ACTIONS FOR THE




T HE basic purpose of statutes limiting the time within which ac-
tions may be brought for the recovery of land is to quiet the title
of possessors who have acted as owners for a lengthy period. The
ethical posture of a possessor may be sound or poor: he may have lost
all evidence of his title or he may have entered the land as a trespasser.
In either event he is protected after the passage of time from the
claims of others who have failed to bestir themselves and to take
effective action to vindicate their rights.
The condition and circumstances of some owners of land handi-
cap them in asserting their rights and titles against adverse possessors.
Hence all jurisdictions recognize disabilities which excuse prompt
initiation of action and which prevent the periods of the statutes of
limitation from running. Disability provisions cannot be said to
operate with delicate regard for the great variety of disabling cir-
cumstances in which human beings find themselves. Rather, the pro-
visions make allowances for easily described, commonly occurring,
disabling conditions, and the hope is that a fair and reasonable accom-
modation is made for persons who are unable to enforce their rights
or who are seriously handicapped in so doing.
Texas has provisions for disabilities which are, in essence, similar
to those existing in other states. The legislative treatment in Texas
consists of listing separately the disabilities in actions for the recovery
of land and the disabilities in personal actions. This separation has
resulted in at least one important difference in the operation of dis-
abilities in the two types of actions. The present Article will confine
itself largely to the disabilities which, in Texas, prevent the running
of limitation periods in real property actions.
II. HISTORY OF ARTICLES 5518 AND 5544
A comprehensive "Act of Limitations" was first passed in the days
of the Republic.! Section 11 of that act listed the disabilities of in-
* B.S., J.D., University of Washington; S.J.D., University of Michigan; Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University. Acknowledgment is made of a generous grant from the
Southwestern Legal Foundation under which a study of the Texas statutes of limitation
affecting real property is being conducted.
1 See Texas Acts 1841, at 163, 2 G.L. 627.
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fancy, coverture, imprisonment, and unsound mind and had applica-
tion to personal actions. Sections 14 through 17 were the predecessors
of the present three-, five-, and ten-year statutes of limitation affect-
ing actions for the recovery of land Each of the latter sections listed
infancy, coverture, and unsound mind as disabilities but omitted
imprisonment. The ten-year statute (section 14) also included "for-
cible occupation of the premises, or county containing them by a
public enemy" as a period of disability.
The Texas Revised Civil Statutes of 1879 put all disabilities affect-
ing actions to recover land in one article.' The limitation periods did
not run if the person having the right to sue was: "1. Under the age
of twenty-one years; or, 2. A married woman; or, 3. Of unsound
mind; or, 4. A person imprisoned. . . ."' Essentially the same language
was used in the disability article affecting actions other than for the
recovery of land.'
In 1895 came a change in the disabilities affecting real property
actions. That year the Twenty-fourth Legislature omitted the dis-
ability of coverture and renumbered the remaining disabilities.' A
proviso was added that "limitation shall not begin to run against
married women until they arrive at the age of twenty-one years;
and, further, that their disability shall continue one year from and
after the passage of this act, and that they shall have thereafter the
same time allowed others by the provisions hereof."' The article list-
ing disabilities in personal actions was continued as before' and has
remained substantially the same up to the present time.'
The 1911 revision of the Texas statutes retained for disabilities in
real property actions the language of the 1895 revision.0 In 1919
the statute" was amended to declare that the following persons were
under disability: "(1) A person, including a married woman, under
2 For the present statutes see Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 5507-10 (1958).
a See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 3201 (1879).
4 Ibid.
'See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 3222 (1879).
'Texas Acts 1895, ch. 30, 10 G.L. 765, amending art. 3201, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
(1879). Later, in the same legislative session, the provision became art. 3352, Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. (1895).
7Texas Acts 1895, ch. 30, 10 G.L. 765. In the revision of 1895, Tex. Rev. Civ. Seat.
art. 3352 (1895), the word "article" was substituted for "act." The proviso went on to
say that the change should have no effect on pending suits.
8See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 3373 (1895).
5 See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 5708 (1911); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5535 (1958).
"See Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. art. 5684 (1911).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 5684 (1919).
1962]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
twenty-one years or [sic] age, or (2) In time of war, a person in the
military or naval service of the United States, or (3) A person of
unsound mind, or (4) A person imprisoned ... '"" A proviso was
added that the period of limitation should not be extended so as to
allow suit for the recovery of land more than twenty-five years after
the cause of action accrued.13
The present article setting forth disabilities in real property actions
was formulated in the 1925 revision of the Texas statutes. 4 Article
5518 reads:
If a person entitled to sue for the recovery of real property or
make any defense founded on the title thereto, be at the time such title
first descend or the adverse possession commence:
(1) A person, including a married woman, under twenty-one years
of age, or
(2) In time of war, a person in the military or naval service of the
United States, or
(3) A person of unsound mind, or
(4) A person imprisoned, the time during which such disability or
status shall continue shall not be deemed any portion of the time
limited for the commencement of such suit, or the making of such
defense; and such person shall have the same time after the removal
of his disability that is allowed to others by the provisions of this
title . ..
Also bearing on the operation of disabilities is article 5544"1 of the
current statutes. It reads: "The period of limitation shall not be ex-
tended by the connection of one disability with another; and, when
the law of limitations shall begin to run, it shall continue to run, not-
withstanding any supervening disability of the party entitled to sue
or liable to be sued." This statute is not included in the subdivisions
of statutes entitled "Limitations of Actions for Lands" or "Limita-
tions of Personal Actions" but appears under "General Provisions."
Hence it applies to both types of actions. The statute was first in-
cluded in the 1879 revision of the Texas statutes"6 and has suffered
no change in language.
III. CASE LAW: How THE DISABILITIES OPERATE
It is generally held that for a disability to prevent a limitation peri-
12 Texas Acts 1919, ch. 55, § 1, 19 G.L. 36th Leg. at 139.
"aThe proviso and its subsequent history are discussed in Larson, Texas Limitations:
The Twenty-Five Year Statutes, 15 Sw. L.J. 177, 179 (1961).
"4See Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 5518 (1958).
"STex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5544 (1958).
"eSee Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 3325 (1879).
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od from running it must exist when the cause of action arises." The
first statute affecting personal actions (section 11) was enacted in
1841 and contained language indicating that the disabilities listed
had no tolling effect if they did not exist when a cause of action
arose. 8 This was not true of the statutes affecting real property ac-
tions, and, indeed, they could have been read to suspend the operation
of limitations during any disability. However, with the 1879 and
later revisions of the Texas statutes, the language has been clear that
a disability must exist when a cause of action arises in order to toll
limitations. Presently article 5518 declares that limitations do not
run "if a person entitled to sue . . . be [under disability] at the time
such title shall first descend or the adverse possession commence."
Even more specific is present article 5544, which states that "when
the law of limitation shall begin to run, it shall continue to run,
notwithstanding any supervening disability."
The Texas decisions have been uniform in holding that a disability
has no tolling effect unless it exists at the time a cause of action
arises. If the adverse possession begins and the owner of the land
later comes under disability, the limitation periods continue to run."
If the adverse possession begins and the owner of the land later con-
veys to a person under disability, the limitation periods are not inter-
rupted."° The same is true if the person under disability received his
title by devise or descent."A different type of situation is presented
"TSee 3 American Law of Property § 15.12 (Casner ed. 1952); Burby, Real Property
232 (2d ed. 1954); 4 Tiffany, Real Property 5 1169 (3d ed. 1939).
"SSee Texas Acts 1841, at 163, 2 G.L. 627: ". .. [A]nd when the law of limitations
did not commence to run prior to the existence of these disabilities, such persons shall
have the same time allowed them after their removal, that is allowed to others by this
and other laws of limitations now in force."
"OBroom v. Pearson, 98 Tex. 469, 85 S.W. 790, aff'd on rehearing, 86 S.W. 733 (1905)
(coverture); Murray v. Slater, 274 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954-Austin) no writ
hist. (insanity); Stubbs v. Lowrey's Heirs, 253 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952-East-
land) error ref. n.r.e (moratorium statutes); Hoencke v. Lomax, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 189,
118 S.W. 817, error ref., 102 Tex. 487, 119 S.W. 842 (1909); Kaack v. Stanton, 51 Tex.
Civ. App. 495, 112 S.W. 702 (1908) error ref. (insanity); Halliday v. Lambright, 29 Tex.
Civ. App. 226, 68 S.W. 712 (1902) no writ hist. (coverture).
"°Johnson v. Schumacher, 72 Tex. 334, 12 S.W. 207 (1888) (coverture); Chandler v.
Alamo Mfg. Co., 140 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940-Austin) no writ hist. (coverture)
(suit for rents); Houston Oil Co. v. Choate, 215 S.W. 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919-
Beaumont), aff'd, 232 S.W. 285 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921) (coverture); Mexia v. Lewis,
3 Tex. Civ. App. 113, 21 S.W. 1016 (1893) (coverture).
"Howard v. Stubblefield, 79 Tex. 1, 14 S.W. 1044 (1890) (insanity); Moody's Heirs
v. Moeller, 72 Tex. 635, 10 S.W. 727 (1889) (coverture, minority); Strickland v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 181 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944-Eastland) no writ hist.
(minority); Sandmeyer v. Dolijsi, 203 S.W. 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918-Galveston) error
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where the owner of land is under disability both when adverse pos-
session begins and when he later conveys to a person not under dis-
ability. Clearly, the limitation periods begin to run when the con-
veyance is complete."
Cases involving the disability of unsound mind illustrate that a
disability must be continuous to bar the operation of a limitation
statute. If adverse possession is begun against a person non compos
mentis, a later interval of lucidity will cause the limitation period to
run without subsequent interruption."
One may wonder why the legislature and the courts have been so
careful to allow tolling of limitation statutes only where a disability
is continuous and exists when the cause of action arises. Undoubtedly
the answer is a strong feeling in favor of the purpose and policy of
limitation statutes. If disabilities were permitted to have a tolling
effect whenever they occur, limitation statutes would often have an
intermittent and uncertain operation over a lengthy span of time.
A. Minority
Many cases have been decided in which the disability of minority
has served to prevent the running of the statutes of limitation.24 This
disability is personal. For example, the minority of a tenant in com-
ref. (minority); Hays v. Hinkle, 193 S.W. 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917-Texarkana) error
ref. (minority).
22 Condra v. Grogan Mfg. Co., 149 Tex. 380, 233 S.W.2d 565 (1950) (purchase from
incompetent).
23See Holt v. Hedberg, 316 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958-Ft. Worth) no writ
hist. (suit to cancel deed); Barber v. Federal Land Bank, 204 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947-Texarkana) error ref. n.r.e.; Joy v. Joy, 156 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941-
Eastland) error ref. w.o.m. (suit to cancel deed); Kaack v. Stanton, 51 Tex. Civ. App.
495, 112 S.W. 702 (1908) error ref.
24 Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 224 S.W.2d 471 (1949); Wiess v. Goodhue, 98 Tex.
274, 83 S.W. 178 (1904); Morton v. Morton, 286 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955-
Texarkana) no writ hist.; Pugh v. Clark, 238 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951-Galves-
ton) error ref. n.r.e.; Lotus Oil Co. v. Spires, 240 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950-
El Paso) error ref. n.r.e.; Kruse v. Sanders, 231 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950-Austin)
no writ hist.; Johnston v. Stinson, 215 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948-Texarkana)
error ref. n.r.e.; Lone Star Gas Co. v. Meyer, 296 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927-Ft.
Worth) error dism. w.o.j.; Easterling v. Simmons, 293 S.W. 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927-
Waco) error ref.; Hays v. Hinkle, 193 S.W. 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917-Texarkana)
error ref.; Kidd v. Prince, 182 S.W. 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916-Dallas), rev'd on other
grounds, 215 S.W. 844 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919); Vanderwolk v. Matthaei, 167 S.W. 304
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914-San Antonio) error ref.; Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Southern
Pine Lumber Co., 147 S.W. 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912-Galveston) no writ hist.; Louisiana
& Texas Lumber Co. v. Lovell, 147 S.W. 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912-Galveston) no writ
hist.; Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912-San Antonio),
aff'd, 108 Tex. 555, 195 S.W. 1139 (1917); Meurin v. Kopplin, 100 S.W. 984 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1907) no writ hist.; Surghenor v. Taliaferro, 98 S.W. 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906)
error dism.; Halliday v. Lambright, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 226, 68 S.W. 712 (1902) no writ
hist.
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mon does not inure to the benefit of his adult cotenant.' Where a
trust exists, minority of a beneficiary helps neither himself nor the
trustee where an adverse possessor occupies trust property." The trus-
tee has full power and right to proceed against the adverse possessor,
and if his title is barred by limitation statutes, the beneficial title is
likewise barred.
The problems of when an infant reaches his majority, when a
statute of limitations begins to run, and when is the last day for
bringing suit are technical questions which are answered in Ross v.
Morrow." In that case one of the plaintiffs was born on April 17,
1860, and it was necessary to determine on what date the five-year
statute of limitations had run against him. The Texas Supreme Court
declared:
The rule adopted in computing the age of a person is that the day of
his birth is included; and, on the day before the twenty-first anni-
versary, he is held to be 21 years of age. Under the operation of this
rule, Nathan Ross was 21 on the 16th day of April, 1881 .... On that
day, April 16, 1881, his disability of minority was removed, and he
could have instituted his suit at any moment of that day. The statute
of limitation, therefore, commenced to run against him on that day.
It follows from this that the 16th day of April, 1881, the day on
which he attained his majority, must be included in the computation
of time against him, and, including it, the five years allowed him
under . . . [the limitation statute] expired on the 15th day of April,
1886, one day before the institution of this suit . 2.8.""
There is no question that the court followed common law principles
in determining when the five-year limitation period expired.2 ' Frac-
tions of days are ignored where the birthday and the last day of the
twenty-first year are concerned. Furthermore, it is to be observed
that the last day for filing suit was held to be the second day prior to
plaintiff's twenty-sixth birthday (anniversary of birth). Therefore,
one should be wary of statements or easy assumptions that a minor
has until his third, fifth, or tenth birthday after reaching twenty-one
years of age to file suit against an adverse possessor."
2 Johnson v. Schumacher, 72 Tex. 334, 12 S.W. 207 (1888); Stovall v. Carmichael, 52
Tex. 383 (1880).
26 Wiess v. Goodhue, 98 Tex. 274, 83 S.W. 178 (1904); see 3 American Law of Property
§ 15.12 (Casner ed. 1952).2' 8 5 Tex. 172, 19 S.W. 1090 (1892).2
'1d. at 175, 19 S.W. at 1091.
25 The court cited Phelan v. Douglass, 11 How. Pr. 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855), and 7
Wait, Actions and Defenses 129 (1879). See also 2 Kent, Commentaries 233 (7th ed. 1851).
"E.g., see Morton v. Morton, 286 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 195 5-Texarkana)
no writ hist. (Plaintiff was born on June 8, 1921; "limitation could not begin to run
against him prior to June 8, 1942.").
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Of course, minority does not prevent a limitation period from run-
ning if the adverse possessor of land is under the disability and not
the owner."a The only question here is whether the minor has entered
and occupied for himself and no other. It has been said that the assent
of a father to his minor son's acquisition of land "by occupying and
cultivating it had the effect of emancipating ... [the son] in so far
as his right to acquire the land was concerned." 2
B. Coverture
Many cases can be found in which the disability of a married
woman was held to prevent the running of limitations with respect
to her separate real property.3 However, these holdings involved cases
concerning coverture arising before the 1895 legislation was passed.
Furthermore, the disability ended when a married woman became
widowed, was divorced, or died.
In the years following 1895, decisions were handed down dealing
with coverture which began before and continued after the new
legislation was enacted. The courts were faithful to the language
of the new statute,"4 holding that coverture existing when the cause
of action arose continued as a disability for a year after the passage
of the new legislation.3" There was no retroactive destruction of the
disability, and the limitation periods began to run only after a year's
interval "after the passage" of the new statute. An authoritative
decision " construed "one year from and after the passage of this act"
to mean a year "after the act took effect, which was ninety days
after the adjournment of the session of the Legislature at which said
act was passed." It is safe to say that after July of 1896 coverture
was no longer a disability." In later years several cases had occasion
"Petty v. Griffin, 241 S.W. 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922-Beaumont) error dism.;
Houston Oil Co. v. Griffin, 166 S.W. 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914-Galveston) error ref.;
for earlier proceedings, see 149 S.W. 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912-Galveston) no writ hist.
" Houston Oil Co. v. Griffin, supra note 31. Similar language was used in the earlier
proceedings. See 149 S.W. at 569.
33 Broom v. Pearson, 98 Tex. 469, 85 S.W. 790, aff'd on rehearing, 98 Tex. 578, 86
S.W. 733 (1905); Johnson v. Schumacher, 72 Tex. 334, 12 S.W. 207 (1888); Hays v.
Hinkle, 193 S.W. 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917-Texarkana) error ref.; Surghenor v. Talia-
ferro, 98 S.W. 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) error dism.; Hymer v. Holyfield, 87 S.W. 722
(Tex. Civ. App. 1905) error Tef.; Wren v. Howland, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 87, 75 S.W. 894
(1903) error ref.; Estes v. Turner, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 365, 70 S.W. 1007 (1902) no writ
hist.; Williams v. Bradley, 67 S.W. 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) error ref.; Fox v. Brady,
I Tex. Civ. App. 590, 20 S.W. 1024 (1892) no writ hist.
" See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
"Veeder v. Gilmer, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 464, 105 S.W. 331 (1907) no writ hist.;
Anderson v. Wynne, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 440, 62 S.W. 119 (1901) no writ hist.; see Williams
v. Bradley, 67 S.W. 170, 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) error ref.
"e Shook v. Laufer, 100 S.W. 1042, 1046 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) error ref.
"v The legislative session in question was adjourned on April 30, 1895. The ninety-day
period prescribed by the Texas Constitution, art. 3, § 39, does not include the day of ad-
[Vol. 16
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to say that coverture was not a disability tolling limitations on real
property actions."8
The proviso to the 1895 statute made it clear that married women
could claim the disability of minority. Moreover, the revision of the
language in 1919, continued in the 1925 Revised Statutes, is unmis-
takable in preserving the disability of minority to married women
under twenty-one years of age. Many decisions since 1895 have con-
firmed the principle that the disability of minority is not affected by
marriage where limitations of actions for the recovery of land are
concerned."
Before its abolition as a disability, coverture was set up as a defense
in several cases in an effort to defeat adverse possession of community
property or the husband's separate property in which the wife claimed
a homestead right. However, the efforts were unsuccessful. In Smith
v. Uzzell "° the land in question was the husband's separate property,
and limitations had run against him. The court said:
Nor do we see how the widow can invoke such a rule. The statutory
bar is complete against those holding the fee in the land, and can it
be possible that one who has no estate at all can have a higher right
than the owner of the fee could have had he lived; that there is some
vitality or magic influence in the fact that land was once the home-
stead, which gives to a claim of homestead, without an estate to
support it, an exemption from the effect of the statute of limitation
which the estate in fee does not enjoy, by which the mere claim of
right to use as a homestead will be preserved, while adverse possession
under the statute divests the only person from whom any estate or
shadow of claim can be derived of the only estate upon which all
others, or rights, must depend for an existence?"
The question answered itself, and the widow's homestead claim was
denied.
journment or the first day an act takes effect. Halbert v. San Saba Springs Land & Live-
Stock Ass'n, 89 Tex. 231, 34 S.W. 639 (1896). Hence the legislative change in the Acts of
1895, ch. 30, was effective on July 30, 1895. But the disability of coverture continued a
year after the change became effective. Because the change was in effect all of July 30,
1895, the year included that date. Thus, the precise date on which coverture ceased to be
a disability was July 30, 1896.
asLotus Oil Co. v. Spires, 240 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950-El Paso) error ref.
n.r.e.; Collins v. Griffith, 125 S.W.2d 419, 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938-Amarillo) error ref.;
Barrett v. Crump, 15 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929-Waco) no writ hist.; Ryman v.
Petruka, 166 S.W. 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914-San Antonio) no writ hist.
" Collins v. Griffith, supra note 38; Holt v. Holt, 59 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933
-Texarkana) error ref., noted, 12 Texas L. Rev. 105 (1933); Huling v. Moore, 194 S.W.
188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917-San Antonio) error ref.; Kidd v. Prince, 182 S.W. 725 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1916-Dallas), rev'd on other grounds, 215 S.W. 844 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919);
Vanderwolk v. Matthaei, 167 S.W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914-San Antonio) error ref.;
Gibson v. Oppenheimer, 154 S.W. 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913-San Antonio) error ref.
4061 Tex. 220 (1884).41 Id. at 222.
1962]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
In Hussey v. Moser"2 the land was community homestead, and de-
fendants and their predecessors occupied it for more than ten years
under a void deed from the husband. Citing the Uzzell case, the court
there said:
In the latter case the alleged homestead was the separate property
of the husband; but no stress is laid upon this fact in the opinion, and
we apprehend that there is no difference in principle whether the
property be of the community estate, or of the separate estate of the
husband. In either case, the wife's power to sue alone for the enforce-
ment of her homestead rights, when her husband refuses to join her,
is recognized by our courts (Kelly v. Whitmore, 41 Tex. 647 [1874]).
. . . The effect, therefore, of the previous decisions upon this subject
is to hold that this article [providing for disabilities] applies only to
the wife's separate property, and not to that in which she holds merely
the homestead interest conferred by our Constitution."
In the Uzzell case adverse possession was had under a sheriff's deed,
while in the Hussey case the husband's deed was voluntary. In the
former case the husband might be expected to protect his wife's
homestead right, but in the latter he would be presumed to be acting
in hostility to her right. Nevertheless, there was no difference in the
operation of the disability statute. The court stated:
... [T]he legislature might well have provided that when the husband
attempts the alienation of the homestead without the consent of the
wife, the statute should not run against her as long as he lives. But
in our opinion they have not done this. The court in Smith v. Uzell,
supra, say, in effect, that an exception in favor of the wife who sets
up claim to homestead merely as such cannot be engrafted on the
statute by the courts. Neither are we at liberty to make a special
exception in a similar case, because the husband has assumed to act
in hostility to her claim."
Other decisions are in accord with the Hussey and Uzzell cases."
Although coverture is no longer a disability, the principle of the
cases probably has other applications. Suppose, for instance, that a
married woman is in her minority when adverse possession starts
against land which is community or separate property of the hus-
band. Undoubtedly she cannot urge that limitations do not run
against her claim of homestead right until she reaches her majority.
The disabilities which may be claimed by a married woman can only
4270 Tex. 42, 7 S.W. 606 (1888).
41 Id. at 46, 7 S.W. at 608.
4 Ibid.
"'Simonton v. Mayblum, 59 Tex. 7 (1883) (community homestead); Sanders v. Word,
50 Tex. Civ. App. 294, 110 S.W. 205 (1908) error ref. (same); Cuellar v. Dewitt, $ Tex.
Civ. App. 568, 24 S.W. 671 (1893) error ref. (same).
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be set up to toll limitations on her rights of action for her separate
property.
It is to be noted that the disability of coverture still exists in per-
sonal actions"' and that it will prevent limitation periods from run-
ning, even though it has no such effect in actions for the recovery of
land.4" No good reason appears for maintaining this difference in the
two types of actions. In real property actions the legislature has ad-
judged that married women, after they reach twenty-one years of
age, are under no substantial handicap in asserting their rights in
court. The same judgment is warranted in personal actions.
C. Unsound Mind
The disability of unsound mind has operated to prevent the limita-
tions from running in many real property actions reaching the
appellate courts." "Unsound mind" denotes either derangement (in-
sanity) or weakness (or lack) of mental faculties. A person is of
unsound mind if he "has not the ability to transact the ordinary
affairs of life, to understand their nature and effect, and exercise his
will in relation to them.""' More specifically, he is of unsound mind
if he does not have "sufficient mental capacity to understand the
nature of bringing or defending a suit for land."'"
In an action for the recovery of land the fact of unsound mind
may be a defense even though there has been no previous action to
establish insanity.51 However, the adjudication of unsound mind in
a proceeding for a guardianship or for commitment establishes the
condition at that time, and a presumption of insanity continues
thereafter."2 On the other hand, an adjudication of restoration of
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5535 (1958).
4 Holt v. Holt, 59 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933-Texarkana) error ref., noted,
12 Texas L. Rev. 105 (1933); Barrett v. Crump, 15 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929-
Waco) no writ hist.
48Condra v. Grogan Mfg. Co., 149 Tex. 380, 233 S.W.2d 565 (1950); Moore v. City
of Waco, 85 Tex. 206, 20 S.W. 61 (1892); Pugh v. Clark, 238 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951-Galveston) error ref. n.r.e.; Kramer v. Sidlo, 233 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950-El Paso) no writ hist.; Zachry v. Moody, 59 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933-
Beaumont) error ref.; Mitchell v. Stanton, 139 S.W. 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911-San
Antonio) error ref.; Kaack v. Stanton, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 495, 112 S.W. 702 (1908)
error ref.
"Charge approved in Kaack v. Stanton, supra note 48.
5 Pugh v. Clark, 238 S.W.2d 980, 986 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951-Galveston) error ref.
n.r.e.
"'Kaack v. Stanton, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 495, 498, 112 S.W. 702, 704 (1908) error ref.;
see Joy v. Joy, 156 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941-Eastland) error ref. w.o.m.
5 Holt v. Hedberg, 316 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958-Eastland) no writ
hist. (suit to cancel deed); Elliott v. Elliott, 208 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948-Ft.
Worth) error ref. n.r.e. (suit to cancel deed); Zachry v. Moody, 59 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933-Beaumont) error ref.; Mitchell v. Stanton, 139 S.W. 1033 (Tex. Civ. App.
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sanity establishes this fact at the time, and the presumption then is
that the person concerned continues to be of sound mind."
"Incompetency" is a term of broader meaning than "unsoundness
of mind." In a land action tried in federal court," the defendant set
up that she had been adjudicated as an incompetent in Oklahoma.
The court, however, rejected her claim that limitations did not run
against her. "[T]he disability which prevents the Texas statutes from
running is not an adjudication of incompetency, but the disability
of an unsound mind.. . ."" The district court had found the defend-
ant to be of sound mind, and the earlier judgment of incompetency
was not considered as being an adjudication of unsound mind.
D. Military Service, Imprisonment, Other Claimed Disabilities
A person is under a disability "in a time of war" if he is "in the
military or naval service of the United States." 5 This provision was
added to the disability statute soon after the First World War, but
Texas decisions have barely touched upon its operation. "7 Further-
more, federal legislation is broader and suspends the running of limi-
tations regardless of whether a cause of action arises before or after
the disability occurs." The federal statute is a constitutional exercise
of the power of Congress to declare and make war and supersedes any
state legislation which is less favorable to a person in the armed
forces." It is to be noticed, however, that the disability statute affect-
ing personal actions in Texas does not mention military or naval
service."'
A person is under disability if he is "imprisoned," and this is true
both in personal actions and actions for the recovery of land. This
1911-San Antonio) error -ref. In the Elliott case the court said:
The implication of the holdings . . . is that an adjudication of insanity by
the county court raises a continuous rebuttable presumption of insanity, and
that only a judgment of restoration of sanity, entered in a proceeding brought
for that purpose, will be sufficient to conclusively remove such rebuttable
presumption. 208 S.W.2d at 715.
3 Elliott v. Elliott, supra note 52.
"Thlocco v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 141 F.2d 934 (5th Cir.), cert. den., 323 U.S.
785 (1944).
55 Id. at 937.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 5518 (1958).
"7 Cases dealing with the disability have been decided under the federal law. See cases
cited note 58 infra.
5"See Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1178, 50 App. U.S.C. §
501, as amended, 50 App. U.S.C. § 520 (Supp. III, 1962); Johnston v. Stinson, 215 S.W.2d
218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948-Texarkana) error ref. n.r.e.; Easterling v. Murphey, 11 S.W.2d
329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928-Waco) error ref.; Comment, Tolling and Suspension of the
Land Limitation Statutes, 9 Baylor L. Rev. 389, 391, 394 (1957).
"OBell v. Baker, 260 S.W. 158 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924) (personal action); Easterling
v. Murphey, supra note 58.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5535 (1958).
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disability has had slight treatment in the cases. In one case, " involving
a personal action, the plaintiff showed that he was in jail from August
4, 1893, continuously (except when he was in court as an attached
witness) until his confinement in the penitentiary on March 17, 1894,
on a conviction for horse theft. He remained in durance vile until
July 12, 1898. The issue presented to the court was whether the plain-
tiff was "in prison" when the cause of action arose on September 15,
1893. The court, answering in the affirmative, said, "It seems to us,
therefore, that appellee was to all intents and purposes 'a person in
prison,' when the cause of action arose, September 15, 1893, and that
he so remained till within less than a year before the filing of this
suit.
62
In several cases the parties have asserted circumstances other than
the disabilities listed in the statutes." However, the courts uniformly
hold that they cannot prevent limitations from running by adding
to the disabilities provided in the statutes.
E. Burden Of Proof
A person who claims title to land by adverse possession has the
burden of pleading and proving compliance with the statutes of
limitation. Does this burden include the negativing of the existence
of disabilities which prevent the limitations from running? Most
decisions answer the question in the negative by stating that the dis-
abilities are exceptions to the statutes of limitation and must be
pleaded and proved by the person defending under them.64
In Smith v. Lancaster," however, a distinction was made among
"1Lasater v. Waites, 67 S.W. 518 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 95 Tex.
553, 68 S.W. 500 (1902).
2 1d. at 519.
6 See Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 73 S.W.2d 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934
-Beaumont) error dism., cert. den., 295 U.S. 741 (1935) (forfeiture of right to do busi-
ness in state); Smith v. Lancaster, 248 S.W. 472, 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923-Texarkana)
error ref. (delay in probate of will); Houston Oil Co. v. Griffin, 166 S.W. 902 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914) error ref.; for earlier proceedings see 149 S.W. 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912-
Galveston) (corporation in receivership); Bowen v. Kirkland, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 346, 44
S.W. 189 (1897) error ref. (contest of appointment of administrator); see Hendron v.
Yount-Lee Oil Co., 119 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938-Texarkana) error ref.
64Martin v. Burr, 111 Tex. 57, 228 S.W. 543 (1921), reversing 171 S.W. 1044 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1914) (prescriptive water right); Morton v. Morton, 286 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1955-Texarkana) no writ hist.; Dortch v. Sherman County, 212 S.W.2d 1018
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948-Amarillo) no writ hist. (prescriptive easement); Niemann v. Garcia,
144 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940-San Antonio) error dism., judgm. cor.; Didier v.
Woodward, 232 S.W., 563- (Tex. Civ. App. 1921-Amarillo) no writ hist.; Krause v.
Hardin, 222 S.W. 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920-San Antonio) error dism.; Louisiana & Texas
Lumber Co. v. Lovell, 147 S.W. 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912-Galveston) no writ hist.;
Lamberida v. Barnum, 90 S.W. 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) error dism. w.o.j.; Elcan v.
Childress, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 193, 89 S.W. 84 (1905) error ref.
65 248 S.W. 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923-Texarkana) error ref.
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the disabilities as to the burden of proof. In that case adverse pos-
session or use of certain property was shown, thereby apparently
establishing a railroad right of way. With respect to the burden of
proof concerning the disabilities of minority, insanity, and imprison-
ment, the court stated:
The "disability" that appellees were called on to affirmatively nega-
tive was, we think, that of minority only. The "disability" of insanity
and of imprisonment was not required to be affirmatively shown to not
exist. Insanity and imprisonment are, unlike minority, only exceptional
occurrences in the lives and experience of mankind, and it is on this
account that it is a presumption of law that all men are sane and that
they obey the laws. This presumption would obtain in this record,
there being no evidence to show to the contrary."
The argument for making a distinction is not convincing. All of
the disabilities constitute circumstances within the peculiar, private
knowledge of the persons claiming them. A distinction is not war-
ranted on the basis of difficulty of producing evidence. It seems un-
fair to compel an adverse possessor to come forward and prove a
negative, i.e., that none of his adversaries or their predecessors were
minors (or under other of the listed disabilities) when the cause of
action arose.
A different type of case is encountered where a plaintiff sues a de-
fendant for injury to a property right gained through adverse pos-
session or prescription against a third party. In City of Austin v.
Hall7 plaintiffs sued the city for interference with their right to use
a public road which had become such through prescription against
the true owners. The question for decision was whether "it [was]
necessary [for plaintiffs] to show that during the prescriptive period
the servient estates, the various tracts of land against which the pre-
scriptive right is claimed, were owned by persons free from legal
disability, and against whom limitation or prescriptive right could be
acquired by adverse use."" The court answered in the affirmative
stating:
Where the right is claimed against one other than the defendant in the
suit or some person under whom he claims, the plaintiff must prove
his right and that no disability existed with the person from whom he
claims to have derived the right. We do not intend to decide what
would be the rule if a prescriptive right were claimed as against the
defendant in the suit or some person whose title he asserts."
l Id. at 474.
6793 Tex. 591, 57 S.W. 563 (1900).
5 Id. at 596, 57 S.W. 564.
61 ibid.
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There is justification for the holding, since the defendant had no
more facility for showing disabilities than did the plaintiffs. Thus,
compelling the plaintiff to prove the non-existence of disabilities
makes unlikely later assertions by owners of the land in question
that they have some type of claim against the defendant. The un-
likelihood is not a certainty, however, since the owners are not bound
by a suit and judgment to which they were not parties.
IV. CASE LAW: TACKING
The prohibition on tacking disabilities follows logically from the
rule that a disability does not prevent limitations from running un-
less it exists at the time the cause of action first accrues. If tacking
were allowed, the limitations would not run after the first disability
expired if, prior to its expiration, another disability happened to come
into existence. Tacking is also not allowed when a period of time
intrudes between the disabilities, since once a limitation begins to
run, a later disability does not stop it. Finally, tacking is not involved
if two (or more) disabilities exist at the time the cause of action
accrues. The person under the disabilities may claim the benefit
of the longer-lasting one."0
There have been repeated instances of attempts to tack one dis-
ability onto another when they affect the same person." Most of the
cases occurred before coverture was abolished as a disability. The
situation developed when adverse possession had begun against a
minor female and she later married while still a minor. However, it
was uniformly held that the statutes of limitation began to run im-
mediately after the marriage took place."2 The Texas Supreme Court
explained:
By the terms of the statute then in force, the marriage of appellant,
Alice Parish, terminated the guardianship. Pas. Dig., art. 6928. It also
703 American Law of Property § 15.12 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 Tiffany, Real Property 5
1169 (3d ed. 1939).
71 Jackson v. Houston, 84 Tex. 622, 19 S.W. 799 (1892); Ragsdale v. Barnes, 68 Tex.
504, 5 S.W. 68 (1887); Parish v. Alston, 65 Tex. 194 (1885); Hinnant v. Rodriguez, 255
S.W. 1000 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923-San Antonio), aff'd, 267 S.W. 471 (Tex. Comm. App.
1925; Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Southern Pine Lumber Co., 147 S.W. 604 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1912--Galveston) no writ hist.; Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Lovell, 147
S.W. 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912-Galveston) no writ hist.; York v. Hutcheson, 37 Tex.
Civ. App. 367, 83 S.W. 895 (1904) no writ hist.; Broom v. Pearson, 81 S.W. 753 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1904), rev'd on other grounds, 98 Tex. 469, 85 S.W. 790 (1905); Grayson v.
Lofland, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 503, 52 S.W. 121 (1899) error ref.; Taylor v. Brymer, 17 Tex.
Civ. App. 517, 42 S.W. 999 (1897) no writ hist.; Smith v. Powell, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 373,
23 S.W. 1109 (1893) no writ hist.
72 See cases cited note 71 supra.
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rendered her, in legal contemplation, of full age, although a minor....
The act which terminated . . . [the disability of minority] imposed
another disability, viz., coverture, to which, if asserted as a protection
against the statute, it might be replied that the cause of action accrued
while she was a minor, and that one disability cannot be connected with




Two years later the court again explained:
Appellant's disability of minority, which existed when the cause of
action first accrued, had been removed by her marriage. She can not
set up her coverture, because, by the terms of the statute, that dis-
ability pertains only to such women as were covert at the time the ad-
verse possession commenced. If the revisers of the statutes had had the
question now before us distinctly in view when they framed the article
quoted, and had desired to remove all doubt upon it, we do not think
they could, by general terms, have expressed that intention more
clearly. 4
In Gibson v. Oppenheimer"' a Texas court had the occasion to ex-
plain the change that occurred when coverture was discontinued as a
disability under the 1895 legislation. In that case adverse possession
was started against an owner of land who was a minor female and
who had later married while still a minor. The court said:
It is true that it is provided in article 4628, R.S. 1911, that every
female under the age of 21 years who shall marry, in accordance with
the laws of the state, shall, after such marriage, be deemed of full
age, and shall have all the rights and privileges she would have, had
she been 21 when she married, and that has been construed many times
to mean that the statute of limitations begins to run against such
minor from the moment of her marriage. Thompson v. Cragg, 24
Tex. 582; Parish v. Alston, 65 Tex. 194. But that rule has been
" Parish v. Alston, 65 Tex. 194, 197, 198 (1885). The same idea was expressed in
Jackson v. Houston, 84 Tex. 622, 19 S.W. 799 (1892), where the court stated:
That exceptions in the statute cannot be accumulated is a well settled and
familiar rule. At the time the right of action accrued in this case-in 1849-
Mrs. Fredonia Kirk was laboring under the disability of minority. That dis-
ability (or exception to the operation of the statute) was, as we have seen,
removed by her marriage in 1861. Under well-settled and numerous authori-
ties, no subsequent disability or exception can be added. 84 Tex. at 626, 19
S.W. at 801.
" Ragsdale v. Barnes, 68 Tex. 504, 506, 5 S.W. 68, 69 (1887). Grayson v. Lofland,
21 Tex. Civ. App. 503, 52 S.W. 121 (1899) error ref., addressed itself to the contention
that a married woman (before 1895) remained a minor until she reached 21 years of age.
The court thought that the disability statute on its face (article 3201 of the 1879 Revised
Statutes) showed that married women were not included in the category of minors. "But
all doubt on the subject is taken away by article 2471, Rev. St. 1879, declaring that fe-
males under 21 years of age who have never married are minors." 21 Tex. Civ. App. at
505, 52 S.W. at 122.
75 154 S.W. 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913-San Antonio) error ref.
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changed by an act of 1895, wherein it is provided "that limitation
shall not begin to run against married women until they arrive at the
age of 21 years," in suits for the recovery of real property. By the
amendment of 1895 ... the disability of infancy of a woman as to
claims for real estate is not removed by marriage, but remains until
she becomes 21 years of age, at which time it begins to run; and their
claims to land will be barred in the same time that those of others
are barred. It is true that the amendment of 1895 has no reference to
any suits except those for land; but as this is a suit for land, and not
to set aside a judgment, it applies. If this were a proceeding to set
aside the judgment, the statute of four years would apply, and Mrs.
Eardley would be barred, because, as to a proceeding of that kind,
the statute began to run when she married. "
In summary, tacking of coverture to minority has been no prob-
lem since 1895 in real property actions because coverture is 'not a
disability. Furthermore, minority continues to be a disability despite
the minor's marriage. By way of contrast, in personal actions the
law seems preserved that coverture removes the disability of minority
and is not tacked, with the result that the limitations will begin to
run at the date of marriage." This is the import of the last sentence in
the quotation from the Oppenheimer decision.
It is clear that if a cause of action for the recovery of land accrues
in the owner and he is under disability, one who succeeds to his title
cannot set up the same or different disability in himself. A common
type of case appearing in the older reports is that in which adverse
possession started during coverture of the owner (before 1895) and
the title descended to minor heirs. The disability of the minor heirs
could not be tacked to the disability of the deceased mother.78 The
court in Hunton v. Nichols' explained the rationale behind the rule:
Unquestionably, if adverse possession of the property was taken
previous to Mrs. Kerfoot's death, the defense of minority or coverture
against the bar of the statute will not avail the plaintiffs. Their
minority cannot be tacked to her coverture. The saving of the statute
is only to those to whom the right first accrues. Successive or cumula-
tive disabilities are of no avail. This is the settled construction of
statutes of limitation; otherwise, statutes intended for the repose and
peace of society by these saving clauses of coverture and minority, by
76 Id. at 697; cf. Comment, Tolling and Suspension of Land Limitation Statutes, 9 Baylor
L. Rev. 389, 392 (1957).
1 See Kruse v. Sanders, 231 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950-Austin) no writ hist.;
D. Sullivan & Co. v. Ramsey, 155 S.W. 580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913-San Antonio) no
writ hist.
" Harris v. Wells, 85 Tex. 312, 20 S.W. 68 (1892); Hunton v. Nichols, 55 Tex. 217
(1881); Laird v. Murray, 111 S.W. 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 908) error ref.; Lamberida v.
Barnum, 90 S.W. 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) error dism. w.o.j.; Elcan v. Childress, 40
Tex. Civ. App. 193, 89 S.W. 84 (1905) error ref.
70 55 Tex. 217, 230 (1881).
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an opposite construction would have the effect of defeating the
benign object of such laws; and so, as it is said, "a right might travel
through minorities for centuries."
Other variations of tacking have also been rejected by the courts.
Thus, the minority of heirs will not be tacked to the disability of in-
sanity of their ancestor."' Nor will it be tacked to the ancestor's minor-
ity."1 Similarly, the insanity of a grantee of land will not be tacked to a
disability of the grantor.' Where adverse possession begins against a
fully competent ancestor and the title descends to heirs who are
under disability, tacking is not involved; limitations continue to run
because no disability existed when the cause of action accrued."
V. SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSION
The disability statute affecting suits to recover land has operated
simply and fairly in favor of those persons who are for various reasons
prevented from enforcing their causes of action. There is no apparent
reason for extending the effect of existing disabilities by permitting
them to be tacked or to stop limitations which have already begun
to run. With respect to the burden of proof, the case law seems to be
pursuing a proper path in requiring that disabilities be pleaded and
proved by the person asserting them.
The difference between the disability statutes in real property and
personal actions is something of a trap for the unwary. Coverture
does not operate as a disability in actions to recover land, and the
same should be true of personal actions. A married woman has equal
rights to bring both types of action. Presumably her husband has the
same interest and inclination to join both types of suits for her
separate property, and if he refuses, she can proceed alone." The rule
in personal actions that coverture ends the disability of minority but
will not be tacked is technical, although it has the merit of elimi-
"Zachry v. Moody, 59 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933-Beaumont) error ref.
"5Easterling v. Simmons, 293 S.W. 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927-Waco) error ref.;
Best v. Nix, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 349, 25 S.W. 130 (1894) no writ hist.
In a personal action coverture of the heirs will not be tacked to the disability of
coverture of their ancestor (mother). Leatherwood v. Stephens, 13 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929-Waco), aff'd, 24 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
"Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Green, 251 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952-Texarkana)
error ref. n.r.e.
83Huling v. Moore, 194 S.W. 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917-San Antonio) error ref.;
Sanders v. Word, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 294, 110 S.W. 205 (1908) error ref.; Best v. Nix,
6 Tex. Civ. App. 349, 25 S.W. 130 (1894) no writ hist.; cases cited notes 20, 21 supra.
Similarly, where limitations began to run against a female who reached twenty-one years
of age, her later marriage (in 1883) did not toll the statutes. Hinnant v. Rodriguez, 255
S.W. 1000 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923-San Antonio), aff'd, 267 S.W. 471 (Tex. Comm. App.
1925).
4 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1983 (1958).
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nating coverture as a disability in that particular case. It would be
preferable that this rule be supplanted by one which simply declares
nonage a disability regardless of coverture.
The suggested change can be accomplished by altering article 5535
of the present statutes to contain an enumeration of disabilities like
that in article 5518." Such a modification would add a disability
(military or naval service in a time of war), but no harm is seen in
this. It is not suggested that the proviso to article 5518 be added,
although consideration could well be given to a limitation period in
personal actions which runs regardless of disabilities. Conformity of
the two statutes would be an improvement in the area of limitations
law, bringing simplicity of rules and similarity of treatment to
litigants.
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 93 (1956) does not list coverture as a disability in an action
to contest the probate of a will. See 12 Baylor L. Rev. 136 (1960).
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